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THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION.  
SOME CONCERNS ABOUT “JUDICIAL LOBBYING”* 
 
MIA CAIELLI1 
 
Civil society organizations are increasingly playing a significant role in the different 
phases of human rights litigation, contributing to changing the nature of the functions 
performed by ordinary, constitutional and supranational courts in contemporary 
democracies. The primary purpose of this article is to analyse the different ways of 
involvements of NGOs and other organized forms of civil society in the administration 
of justice, with the aim of highlighting how their activity is proving to be quite similar 
to lobbyism. Secondly, it discusses the perception of human rights courts as an arena 
of public debate and the consequent need for more clarity and transparency in the use 
of third-party interventions, public oral hearings and popular actions. 
 
SUMMARY: I. Introduction: the judiciary as a political arena - II. The different forms of 
involvement of civil society in human rights adjudication - III. On the consequences of 
public participation in constitutional litigation: a paved way for judicial activism - IV. “In 
the name of the people”: whose interests do judicial decision makers really serve?   
 
I.  INTRODUCTION: THE JUDICIARY AS A POLITICAL ARENA 
 
Many factors have contributed to changing the nature of the functions performed 
by apex, constitutional and supranational courts in contemporary democracies. Their task 
has been growing and changing ever since the advent of social democracy: parliaments 
have undergone significant transformations following the crisis of the liberal state and, 
similarly, constitutional and human rights courts have been required to meet new 
expectations based on the demand for effective welfare rights. The functions of 
constitutional courts have evolved constantly in the recent past due to various factors, 
including the crisis of representative democracy, the problems of democratic 
consolidations in certain areas of the world, and above all, the diversity and pluralism of 
contemporary societies. The latest, in particular, demands – as Häberle pointed out on 
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many occasions– the involvement of constitutional judges in the guarantee of the 
constitution as a social contract, since they participate in its development and updating 
through their functioning as courts of the society in general, more than as state courts2. 
The expansion of constitutional adjudication throughout the globe and courts 
willing to bear the burden of social and legal change, to fill unconstitutional vacuums and 
possibly use their power to guide traditional decision makersare accompanied by a 
constantly increasing presence of a wide range of civil society organizations in the 
different phases of litigation. In the never-ending controversy over the legitimacy of so-
called “strong”judicial review, a new element must be taken into consideration: the judiciary has 
become a locus for the exercise of democracy. This has to do with the very simple and 
irrefutable fact that constitutional judges and supranational courts such as the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, the European Court of Human Rights and its Latin 
American counterpart, namely the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, are political 
decision makers. Dahl’s contribution to the understanding of the role of the Supreme 
Court of the United States during the past century is far from updated: his idea of a 
judicial body that «cannot act strictly as a legal institution», since it has to «choose among 
controversial alternatives of public policy by appealing to at least some criteria of acceptability on questions 
of fact and value that cannot be found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution»3, is of 
paramount importance to determiningand appraising the nature of the functions 
performed by contemporary constitutional and international judges. Since it has become 
clear that constitutional and supranational judges are important centres of policy making, 
civil and human rights organizations, laborunions, environmental NGOs and other kinds 
of public interest groups began to interface with courts more thans seeking to influence 
the work of parliaments. After all, «when the notorious bank robber Willie Sutton was asked why 
he robbed banks he reportedly replied “because that is where they keep the money”»4. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 P. HÄBERLE, Lo Stato costituzionale (translation by F. POLITI AND S. ROSSI), Roma, 2005, pp. 
159-160. 
3 R.A. DAHL, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 
in Journal of Public Law, 1957, vol. 6, pp. 279 ss., at 281. Attention to the political role of 
constitutional courts has also been paid by Italian legal scholarship very recently: see A. 
SPADARO, Sulla intrinseca “politicità” delle decisioni giudiziarie dei tribunal costituzionali 
contemporanei, in Federalismi.it, 8 marzo 2017. 
4 R. PACELLE, The Supreme Court in a Separation of Powers System: The Nation’s Balance Wheel, 
New York, 2015, at 172.	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The relationship between law and social movements is stricter than ever: litigation 
and reliance on the courts for advancing their right-based goals has undoubtedly proven 
effective. This can be seen as both the cause and the effect of the increased popular 
confidence in the judiciary, since the involvement of civil society in the delivery of justice 
is both the result of the political power of courts and an instrument judges use in order 
to gain legitimacy. The danger of an excessive judicial insulation breeding “ivory tower 
attitude” feared by Cardozo in the early 20th century5 has been largely averted: the 
judiciary is all but apart from the mainstream of society. The basis of apex and 
constitutional courts’ legitimacy does not seem to be solely legal expertise anymore: 
public support has clearly emerged as a new source of legitimation, thus breaking the 
monopoly elected assemblies had on claiming to hold public mandate6.   
 
II. THE DIFFERENT FORMS OF INVOLVEMENT OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN HUMAN 
RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
 
Individuals and organized forms of civil society can play their role at different 
stages of judicial proceedings, each with its peculiar characters and impact on final 
judicial outcomes. Well aware of the fact that preliminary to such analysis is the meaning 
we attach to civil society and also that an exhaustive review of the immense literature 
exploring the notion would go beyond the scope of this paper, it would be sufficient here 
to clarify that the expression is here intended as opposed to political society and also 
distinguished from the economic sphere. Therefore, one of the most appropriate 
definitions is the one given by the World Bank: «The wide array of non-governmental and not-
for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their 
members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. 
Civil society organizations there for refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, NGOs, 
labour unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional 
associations, and foundations»7. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 B.N. CARDOZO, The Nature of Judicial Process, New Haven, 1921, at 129. 
6 See O. BASSOK, The Supreme Court’s New Source of Legitimacy, in University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 16, 2013, pp. 153 ss., reflecting on the rise of the 
so-called “public opinion culture”, where «opinion polls have served in the public discourse 
as an authoritative democratic legitimator» (p.158). 
7 World Bank, 2010, at www.worldbank.org. 
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The first and more direct way all these groups have to “speak law to power”8 is 
lodging a complaint in the public interest in all legal systems providing individual access 
to constitutional justice through action popularis. This is the case of many Latin American 
countries and a few Central and Eastern European democracies, but also of some Asian 
jurisdictions where individual direct access to supreme courts for the protection of 
fundamental rights is granted in the public interest9. Besides, different kinds of 
associations have a legal standing in a variety of civil rights claims at the domestic and 
supranational level. For example, the European so-called “equality directives” allow a 
variety of civil society organizations to challenge discriminatory conduct either on behalf 
or in support of the complainant in collective discrimination cases, as well as in cases 
where no individual victims can be identified10.  
Secondly, following the “public interest law movement” of 1950s and 1960s in 
the United States, more and more organized forms of civil society around the world 
engage in strategic litigation, taking on legal cases as part of a strategy to achieve broader 
systemic change11. 
Moreover, non-profit organizations tend to concentrate their advocacy work 
before the judiciary filing briefs as amici curiae.The global rise of third-party 
interventions - even in civil law countries12 - can be attributed to the influence of 
international jurisdictions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and has been transforming an ancient legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 This expression has been used for the first time by R. ABEL, Speaking Law to Power. 
Occasions for Cause Lawyering, in A. SARAT, S. SCHEINGOLD (eds), Cause lawyering: Political 
Commitments and Professional Responsabilities, New York, 1998, pp. 69 ss., explaining the use of 
legal mechanisms and processes to change dominant power relations. 
9 Among these countries, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh (M. CAIELLI, Cittadini e giustizia 
costituzionale. Contributo allo studio dell’actio popularis, Torino, 2015, pp. 36-60). 
10 Article 7(2) of Directive 2000/43 and Article 9(2) of Directive 2000/78 provide that 
«Member States hall ensure that associations, organisations or other legal entities which have, in 
accordance with the criterial aid down by their national law, a legitimate interest in ensuring that the 
provisions of [these Directives] are complied with, may engage, either on behalf or in support of the 
complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or administrative procedure provided for the 
enforcement of obligations under [these Directives]». A similar provision is contained in 
art.17 of Recast Directive 2006/54/EC on the implementation of the principle of equal 
opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and 
occupation. 
11 The reasons behind the success of public interest law, particularly in post-authoritarian 
countries, are explored by S. L. CUMMING, L. G. TRUBEK, Globalizing Public Interest Law, in 
UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs, vol. 13, 2008, pp. 1 ss. 
12 S. KOCHEVAR, Amici Curiae in Civil Law Jurisdictions, in Yale Law Journal, vol. 122, 2013, 
pp.1653 ss. 
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instrument into a way of performing an activity that «raise[s] the attention of public opinion, 
playing an important role in a democratic court system»13 and an activitythat is far from neutral, 
but rather takes on the traits of lobbying14. Judges seek advice in much the same way as 
members of parliament use information provided by interest groups and experts during 
committee hearings to determine policy options. 
With regard to European courts, there is a crucial difference between the roles 
third parties can play before the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the European Union: while third-party intervention before the European Court 
of Human Rights is explicitly admitted by Article 36(2) of the European Convention of 
Human Rights, allow in any State or person concerned not party to the proceeding to 
submit written comments or take part in hearings, the Court of Justice of the European 
Union’s current procedures do not allow for the submission of amicus briefs, since the 
possibility to submit written observations on pending cases is only granted to EU 
member states and the European Commission. Yet, NGOs, research centers, academics, 
human rights associations and so on, are likely to begin to perform their advocacy activity 
also before the judiciary of the European Union. The desire to “talk to” Luxembourg 
judges has recently determined a not for profit European citizen’s initiative to set up an 
online platform inviting everyone to «share with the Court [their]knowledge, perspective 
or interests in a particular case, in the form of an amicus curiae brief», following the 
premise that «a sound adjudication of such complex and/or high impact cases requires the Court to 
consider all available knowledge and perspectives, the balancing of all interests at take and a well 
informed assessment of the implications of its decision for third parties and society at large»15. 
Furthermore, the increasingly widespread practice of public oral hearings has 
been transforming some supreme and constitutional courts into places for political 
participation where people feel that their voice is heard. The Latin American case is 
emblematic. Significant experiences of public oral hearings as a tool for fostering popular 
participation have been characterizing the Colombian and Argentinian judicial review of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 L. VAN DEN EYNDE, An Empirical Look at the AmicusCuriaePractice of Human Rights NGOs 
Before the European Court of Human Rights, in Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, vol. 31, 
2013, pp. 271 ss, at 275. 
14 S. KRISLOV, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, in Yale Law Journal, vol. 
72, 1963, p. 694.  
15 The online platform is available at https://www.amicus-ecj.eu. 
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legislation for a while16. Interestingly enough, the Brazilian legislator, though Laws 9868 
and 9882 of 1999, has extended to the judiciary the possibility granted to the Chamber of 
Deputies and the Federal Senate to hold public hearings with civil society entities17. Right 
after the first two notorious public hearings on biosafety and embryonic system-cells 
research had been held, the rules for summoning and holding public hearings have been 
broadened with the effect of de facto admitting the possibility of adopting a public hearing 
in any sort of claim or appeal18. In fact, it’s now stated that it is upon the rapporteur to 
listen publicly to depositions by people who have experience with and authority on the 
matter, «whenever he/she understands the clarification of matters or factual 
circumstances are needed, in cases with general repercussion and that are of relevant 
public interest»19. 
The importance of the role played by oral hearings is becoming evident even at 
the Court of Justice of the European Union. Its (recast) Rules of Procedure undertaken in 
2012 and the Practice Directions to Parties adopted in 2013 allow a hearing to be arranged 
«whenever it is likely to contribute to a better understanding of the case and the issues raised by it»20, but 
only upon a reasoned request from the parties and other interested persons and if the Court agrees to hold 
it, since it may consider, «on reading the written pleadings or observations lodged during the written part 
of the procedure, that it has sufficient information to give a ruling»21. Yet, according to former 
Justice Allan Rosas, oral hearings can be considered as «a point of contact between not only the 
Court and the parties and interested persons but also the public at large»22, since «they draw spectators 
like academics, students, journalists, NGO representatives and other interested milieus»23. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 R. GARGARELLA, Elpapel del Poder Judicial dentro del nuevo “constitucionalismo diálogico”, in 
F. GONZÁLES (ed.), Governança e democracia representativa, São Paulo, 2017, pp. 101 ss., p. 107-
110. 
17 Art. 58 of the 1988 Constitution.  
18 M.C. HENNIG LEAL, Public Hearings in the Ambit of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court: A 
New Form of Participation in Public Affairs, Paper presented at the IX World Congress of 
Constitutional Law, Oslo, 2014, available at http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/news-
and-events/events/conferences/2014/wccl-cmdc/wccl/papers/ws16/w16-leal.pdf. 
19 Amendment of Procedural Rule no. 29 of 2009. 
20 Practice Directions to Parties, para. 45. 
21 Rules of Procedures, Art. 76, para. 2. 
22 A. ROSAS, Oral Hearings Before the European Court of Justice, in Maastricht Journal of 
European and Comparative Law, vol. 21, 2014, pp. 596 ss., at 609. 
23 Ibidem, note 45. 
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III. ON THE CONSEQUENCES OF PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN JUDICIAL PROCESSES: 
A PAVED WAY FOR JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
 
The involvement of civil society in human rights and constitutional adjudication 
produces interesting effects at various levels. 
In the first place, one consequence of the process of democratization of 
constitutional judicial review has to do with the enforcement of judicial decisions. 
It’s worth recalling Hamilton’s description of the judiciary in the Federalist n. 78, 
where he explained how the power of the Supreme Court, with no control of the purse 
or the sword, «must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its 
judgments»24. This does not seem to correspond to the truth anymore, since it the 
admission of a wide range of third party interventions or oral hearings has proved to be a 
good resource to address potential non compliance. In other words, courts might 
strategically use resources like public oral hearings to increase the chances of gaining 
compliance. To mention just one example, a recent empirical study showed how the 
German Constitutional Court seeks to attract popular attention through public oral 
hearings when holding government officials accountable for breaches of their 
constitutional obligations in order to maximize the chance such rulings will be 
accompanied by electoral pressures on the government to comply25. Implementation of 
constitutional courts’ decisions is an issue also with regard to the classical function of 
constitutional justice: it is well known that the exercise of judicial review of legislation 
can provoke legislative reactions in the sense that parliaments may find the way not to 
adequately implement constitutional courts’ rulings and always have the power to over 
ride a decision through constitutional amendments. But it is known that when courts 
enjoy a high degree of popular support, the risk of legislative decisions not to comply 
with judicial rulings lowers significantly, since they may result in a negative public 
backlash26. 
Secondly, this sort of cooperation between the people and courts ends up having 
significant consequences on the separation of powers, since it often leads to judicial 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 A. HAMILTON, Federalist no. 78, in J.E. Cooke (ed.), The Federalist, Middletown, CT, 1961, 
at 523. 
25 J. N. KREHBIEL, The Politics of Judicial Procedures: The Role of Public Oral Hearings in the 
German Constitutional Court, in American Journal of Political Science, 2016, vol. 60, pp. 990 ss. 
26 G. VANBERG, Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-TheoreticApproach to Constitutional 
Review, in American Journal of Political Science, vol. 45, 2001, p. 346 ss., at 347. 
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activism and therefore to encroachment on legislative and executive functions. 
Constitutional and, more generally, human rights judges, are no longer conceived as 
kelsenian “negative legislators”, since they tend to act as assistants of traditional political 
bodies and are elevated to the rank of prestigious key dialogue partners of parliaments 
and governments, with the often uncontroversial power to issue orders containing 
provisional rules to be applied pending the enactment of legislation aimed at filling 
normative gaps27. Therefore, it’s not surprising that constitutional courts all around the 
world are increasingly perceived as “third chambers” or «Überparlament»28: what is 
particularly interesting and worthy of mention is how such an interference does not 
generally bring about any strong reactions from elected legislative assemblies. 
Parliamentary support for judicial authority and for a high level of judicialized politics is a 
widespread phenomenon in contemporary democracies susceptible of multiple 
explanations. 
It has been suggested how «at the very least, the judicialization of fundamental political 
questions offers a convenient refuge for politicians seeking to avoid making difficult no-win moral and 
political decisions»29. This is certainly a theory which is hard not to agree with. But Hirschl’s 
critical reflection suggests another, disturbing, reason behind the delegation of power to 
courts: the transfer of policy-making power from legislatures and executives to judges 
can be considered as «a conscious strategy undertaken by threatened political elites seeking to preserve 
or enhance their hegemony by insulating policy-making from popular political pressures, and supported by 
economic and judicial elites with compatible interests»30.  
Among the different questions inspired by such thought-provoking idea, which 
follows the line of thinking of other well known scholars arguing that judicial review may 
legitimize majoritarian policies31, the present article intends to address the issue of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 On constitutional courts’ interference with parliaments regarding legislative omissions, 
see the detailed analysis by A.R. BREWER-CARÍAS, Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators, 
Cambridge, 2011, pp. 125-171. 
28 A. SPADARO, Di una Corte che non si limita ad “annullare” le leggi, ma “corregge” il legislatore 
e, dunque, scrive – o “riscrive” per intero – le leggi (il caso emblematico della giurisprudenza 
normativa sulle adozioni), in A. RUGGERI, G. SILVESTRI (eds.), Corte costituzionale e Parlamento. 
Profili problematici e ricostruttivi, Milano, 2000, pp. 337 ss., at 357, suggestinghow the legislative 
role of the ItalianConstitutional Court can be consideredas a phenomen on which is not 
pathological,  but can rather be understood as a natural evolution of  the constitutional state 
(pp. 357-361).  
29 R. HIRSCHL, Towards Juristocracy. The Origins and Consequences of the New 
Constitutionalism, Cambridge, MA – London, 2004, at 213. 
30 Ibidem, at 99. 
31 Half a century ago Dahlsuggested that «the policy views dominant to the Court are never for 
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the law making majorities of the United States» 
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possible contribution civil society can bring to a truly counter-majoritarian functioning of 
judicial review, entailing the protection of political minorities not merely as the result of 
an occasional convergence between majority and minority interests. 
The present considerations on the process of democratization of judicial review 
are built upon a basic assumption: the core of constitutional justice, to say it in Sunstein’s 
words, is to «aggressively review any effort to stifle political dissent»32, agreeing that courts should 
play «an especially large role when rights central to democratic government are at stake, or when groups 
not able to protect themselves through ordinary politics are atrisk»33. Given the above, popular 
participation in constitutional and human rights litigation can really play a prominent role 
to«ensure that judicial review reliably promotes a core democratic value - freedom from 
government domination – without seriously threatening other democratic values»34.  
As mentioned before, supreme and constitutional court judges around the world, 
with few exceptions, enjoy popular trust also because they are increasingly perceived as a 
forum – sometimes the only forum – of public debate.  
There is another factor possibly explaining the acceptance of an intrusive judicial 
review, namely the emerging representative function of the courts. It is apparent that 
contemporary supreme and constitutional courts are trying to increase their 
representativeness: written or customary rules concerning their composition often seek 
to reflect the society they serve and judicial appointments pay a great deal of attention to 
public opinion. The practice of confirmation hearings for Supreme Court justices offers 
just one paradigmatic example: recent scholarship has insisted on how greater public 
support strongly increases the probability that a senator will vote to approve a nominee 
since «presidents often “go public” in support of their nominees in the hope of shifting public 
opinion»35and electoral incentives do the rest, with the effect of de facto tying the Court 
back to the public. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(R.A. DAHL, supra note 2, at 285). See, more recently, M.E.K. HALL, J.D. URA, 
Judicialmajoritarianism, in Journal of Politics, vol. 77, 2015, pp. 818 ss. 
32 C.R. SUNSTEIN, Introduction - The Legitimacy of Constitutional Courts: Notes on Theory and 
PracticeFeature: Questioning Constitutional Justice: Introduction, in East European Constitutional 
Review, 1997, pp. 61 ss., at 63. 
33 Ibidem. 
34 M.E.K. HALL, Judicial Reviewas a Limit on Government Domination: Reframing, Resolving, 
and Replacing the (Counter)Majoritarian Difficulty, in Perspectives on Politics, vol. 14, 2016, pp. 
391 ss., at 391. 
35 J. P. KASTELLEC, J. R. LAX, J. PHILLIPS, Public Opinion and Senate Confirmation of Supreme 
Court Nominees, in Journal of Politics, 2010, vol. 72, no. 3, pp. 767 ss., at 772. 
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Moreover, public confidence in the courts has been increased as a consequence 
of the changing of the structure and style of judicial decisions since they seek to reflect 
their real audience, namely the citizens, while in some Latin American countries the 
phenomenon of judges explain their decisions personally, speaking out to the people and 
even «adopting public relations strategies to make it harder for politicians to ignore or retaliate against 
their decisions»36, has recently become quite significant37. Some Supreme Courts’ plenary 
deliberations are broadcast as well. An interesting example comes from Brazil, where the 
Federal Supreme Court has a channel on YouTube, a Twitter profile and a radio station 
is partially dedicated to this agenda38: its hearings (and the above mentioned public oral 
hearings) have been shown on TV and social media for over a decade, providing an 
excellent platform for the court and for every judge to reach a broad audience, thus 
providing «the entire population with general, unrestricted, and immediate knowledge on the debates 
held there»39. 
It’s now known that highest courts have become more representative of 
aspirations and social demands than traditional political institutions: consequently, it has 
been argued how, in many contemporary democracies, the representative function of 
constitutional jurisdiction has become more visible and can be considered «the most 
important institutional transformation of the last decade»40.Therefore, popular participation in 
judicial decision-making plays multiple roles. On the one hand, it serves the courts’ 
“search of legitimacy”41. On the other hand, it seems to ease the tension between judicial 
review and the democratic process as suggested by Alexy’s idea of constitutional review 
”argumentative representation” of the people, insisting on the necessity of incorporating 
constitutional jurisdiction in the democratic process in the sense that constitutional 
courts should be designed as centers of reflection of the political process and found their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36 D. W. Arguelhes, JudgesSpeaking for the People: JudicialPopulism Beyond JudicialDecisions, in 
I-CONnect/Verfassungsblog, 4 May 2017 (http://www.iconnectblog.com). 
37 With regard to Mexican jurisdiction, see the detailed analyisis of J.K. Staton, Judicial 
power and strategic communication in Mexico, Cambridge, 2010. 
38 J.A. DA SILVA, Deciding without Deliberating?, in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 
vol. 11, 2013, pp. 557 ss. 
39 M.C. HENNIG LEAL, supra note 17, at 10. 
40 R.L. BARROSO, Reason Without Vote: The Representative and Majoritarian Function of 
Constitutional Courts, in T. Bustamante, B. Gonçalves Fernandes (eds.), Democratizing 
Constitutional Law, Switzerland, 2016, pp. 71 ss., at 75. 
41 From the title of the second chapter (Constitutional Courts in Search of Legitimacy) of the 
volume by W. SADURSKI, Rights Before Courts. A Study of Constitutional Courts in Post communist 
States of Central and Eastern Europe, The Netherlands, 2014, pp. 45 ss.  
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pretensions so that citizens (or, in his wording, the “constitutional persons”) can 
rationally approve their reasoning42. 
 
IV.“IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE”: WHOSE INTERESTS DO JUDICIAL DECISION 
MAKERS REALLY SERVE?   
 
The involvement of civil society in constitutional adjudication raises at least two 
inextricably intertwined concerns. 
In the first place, it is crucial to ask ourselves how do courts use civil society in 
order not to dismiss the risk of what we might call “judicial populism”: the courts claim 
to speak for the people and present themselves as channelling popular sentiment and 
speaking for the true interests of the people. India, beginning in the Nineties43, and Brazil 
in the very recent past, are emblematic examples of countries where the only public 
institutions with a consistently high approval rate are federal supreme courts. But the 
phenomenon is wide spread and common to many consolidated democracies sharing the 
political representation crisis contributing to make the judiciary the best interpreter of the 
majority sentiment in certain contexts. But a major problem arises with regard to the 
individuation of the true “majority sentiment”. We must face the same old dilemma 
concerning participatory democracy and the real role of direct citizen participation in 
government decision-making. Therefore, it is possible to imagine two different 
hypotheses about the real relationship between judges and civil society or, in other 
words, the “common people” qualitative contribution to the court’s reasoning. 
Under the first hypothesis, judges defend their authority from political attacks 
using the persuasive argument of popular will, especially when a case raises sensitive and 
controversial issues related to morality or ethics. It will be sufficient here to mention how 
judicial recognition of same-sex marriage, passive euthanasia and abortion, to name a few 
issues, in different domestic and transnational courts is the result of either popular 
actions or strategic litigation anticipated and followed by brilliant social media campaigns, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 R. ALEXY, Balancing, Constitutional Review, and Representation, in International Journal of 
Constitutional Law, 2005, pp. 579 ss. 
43 The legal literature on the representative role of the Indian Supreme Court is 
conspicuous: see R. DHAVAN, Judges and Indian Democracy: The Lesser Evil? in F.R. FRANKEL 
(ed.), Transforming India: Social and Political Dynamics of Democracy, New Delhi, 2000, pp. 314 
ss. 
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the participation of many powerful NGOs as amici curiae, and, in afew cases, well attended 
public oral hearings. 
However, sometimes, the contribution of civil society seems to be merely 
functional to the legitimacy of certain decisions without any evidence of real and 
effective participation. With regard to public hearings as an emerging tool to foster 
people participation in constitutional litigation, attention should be drawn to the recent 
Brazilian experience that shows how often public dialogues between judges and civil 
society end up being a mere rhetorical strategy lacking any real impact on the outcome of 
the controversy before the Supreme Federal Court44. 
On the other side, even when courts effectively borrow from third party 
interventions and – with regard to all different forms of public interest litigation where 
civil society organizations exercise their law-based advocacy activity- do not “cherry 
pick” the cases they wish to rule on when granting certiorari or declaring the admissibility 
of an individual constitutional complaint, some attention should be paid to the real 
nature and ambitions of associations, groups, foundations engaging in litigation both as 
parties to the proceedings and as friends of the court. To put it other wise, 
considerations on lobbying and legislative activity45– conceived as a way to increase the 
representativeness of certain institutions46 - apply to public interest litigators, amici curiae 
and third-party oral interveners as well. North-American studies at the end of the last 
century47, as well as more recent studies concerning the amicus curiae practice before the 
European Court of Human Rights48, suggest that this is the case for what we might call 
“judicial lobbyism”, since the amicus curiaès role is far from delivering independent 
information and advice. Amici curiae are more friends of one of the parties, sometimes 
simply reinforcing their briefs rather than contributing new arguments, than friends of 
the Court. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for lawyers of the parties to build coalitions 
with amici curiae for the very simple reason that repeated information is useful and it 
shows consistency across actors and strong support with an obvious impact on how 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 M.C. HENNIG LEAL, supra note 17, pp. 8-12. 
45 On the topic, see the recent work by R. DE CARIA, «Le mani sulla legge»: il lobbying tra free 
speech e democrazia, Torino, 2017. 
46 With regard to the institutions of the European Union, see the study by S. SASSI, I 
rappresentanti di interessi nel contesto europeo. Ruolo e sinergie con le istituzioni, Milano, 2012, pp. 
93 ss. 
47 G.A. CALDEIRA, J.R. WRIGHT, Lobbying for Justice: Organized Interests Supreme Court 
Nominations, and United States Senate, in American Journal of Political Science, vol. 42, 1998, pp. 
499 ss. 
48 L. VAN DEN EYNDE, supra, note 12, at 288-293. 
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justices view the credibility of arguments. With regard to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, it has been repeatedly noticed that its decisions often represent the 
struggle of interest groups to put their policy views into law49. Recent European and 
North American data tell us that there is room for non-parties to provide information 
that can really influence judicial choices50. Therefore, it seems urgent to ask ourselves a 
few questions such as: who are really the individuals and associations intervening in 
judicial proceedings in the public interest? To put it in other words: how transparent are 
NGOs and other associations with regard to their funding and finalities? 
The traditional literature on judicial independence tends to discuss how judges are 
to be kept away from politics and from the other branches of government but less 
attention has been paid to the necessary insulation from undue influence from private 
interests. 
Some criticism over the judicial activity of certain organizations seems well 
founded and has much to do with the huge resources and experience of some of them 
that might cause them to out match the litigants or with the fact that they are usually 
based in the developed and industrial world and therefore able to influence the law of 
non-Western countries without taking into account their traditions, culture, and 
peculiarities51.The promotion of international public interest law brought up many 
questions about national autonomy and identity: lawyers and activists on the ground 
often considerate as a sort of human rights imperialism and «view it as an unwanted 
American export, a tool of social control that dissipates political conflict through legalization or displaces 
more emancipatory forms of legal resistance»52.  
Are there any tools available to avoid the degeneration of this peculiar form of 
participatory democracy? 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 L. EPSTEIN, Interest Group Litigation During the Rehnquist Era, in Journal of Law and Politics, 
vol. 9, 1993, pp. 639 ss. 
50 The North-American literature on how organized interests influence Supreme Court’s 
decision making has become highly conspicuous in recent times: since the publication of the 
land mark study by P.M. COLLINS, Friends of the Supreme Court: Interest Groups and Judicial 
Decision Making, New York, 2008, significant research has been conducted in the field of 
interest group litigation: see, most recently, P.M. COLLINS, P.C. CORLEY, J. HAMNER, The 
Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs on U.S. Supreme Court Opinion Content, in Law & Society 
Review, 2015, vol. 49, p. 917 ss.; L. Manzi, M.E.K. HALL, Friends You Can Trust: a Signaling 
Theory of Interest Group Litigation before the US Supreme Court, in Law & Society Review, vol. 51, 
2017. 
51 S. KOCHEVAR, supra note 13. 
52 S. L. CUMMING, L. G. TRUBEK, supra note 10, at 4. 
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Among the possible solutions, we might imagine the adoption of clear procedural 
rules before the courts for both public oral hearings and the admission of third party 
interventions, as well as a priori control over associations before recognizing their legal 
standing to bring cases in the public interest. 
Recent rules adopted in certain Latin American jurisdictions offer some 
interesting examples. Be it sufficient here to cite the Argentinian Supreme Court’s 
recently amended procedural rules. The Acordada no. 7/2013 stress the importance and 
prominent role of amici curiae, explaining that they«help increase the public constitutional debate 
and the legitimacy of judicial decisions»:but they must prove their expertise on the issue or 
declare whether they received financial or other material support from any of the parties, if 
the out come of the case might grant them an economic benefit and if they have any relationship with the 
parties to the dispute53. To put it in other words, it seems urgent to accelerate the adoption 
of initiatives aimed at increasing the transparency and accountability of NGOs and other 
associations that pretend to act as a counter weight to state power in order to avoid the 
risk of some of them being nothing more than the old ruling elites, the so-called “talking 
classes”54in disguise.  
I would argue that the so-called “judicialization” of politics and the tendency for 
groups unsuccessful at pursuing their goals through the electoral and legislative processes 
to seek policy change by judicial decision are not pathological, but a natural and 
physiological phenomena even if the risk that the judges will be seen as just another 
bunch of politicians subject to the same pressures as other politicians, is a 
concern55.Popular participation in judicial decision-making might be considered as an 
excellent tool to allow different forms of organized civil society to give voice to those 
“discrete and insular minorities” mentioned in the famous Footnote 4 that greatly 
influenced North American jurisprudence on the Equal Protection Clause56. Human 
rights adjudication is the place where a new form of citizenship, that we might call 
“global citizenship”, may emerge, since members of todays’ most subordinate groups 
(namely foreigners) do not have access to traditional political representation. 
If it’s true that the new constitutionalism – and, more precisely, the enormous 
impact that the constituzionalization of human rights had on the size and scope of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Art. 2, Acordada no. 7/2013. 
54 C. LASCH, The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy, New York – London, 1995. 
55 M. SHAPIRO, A. STONE SWEET, On Law, Politics, and Judicialization, 2002.  
56 The most famous foot note in constitutional law is part of the decision of the Unite States 
United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
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judicial review - is to be understood as part of a larger effort by elites to insulate policy 
making from democratic impulses57, there seems to be enough room to remain 
convinced of the great opportunity represented by the interaction of civil society groups 
with domestic and international judicial bodies. 
These considerations on courts as fields of political battles and new democratic 
arenas, although posing more questions than providing answers, intend to raise a crucial 
issue regarding the true nature of popular involvement in constitutional adjudication and 
draw the attention to the consequent need of legal regulation of the emerging 
phenomenon of judicial lobbying which has been largely side lined in legal and political 
scholarship. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
57 R. HIRSCHL, supra note 4, passim. 
